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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RENE RUIZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920126-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did a warrant to search defendant's apartment, which 
was supported by probable cause, also properly authorize police 
officers to conduct the search at night, and on an unannounced, 
"no-knock" basis? 
To justify a no-knock, nighttime search, the affidavit 
supporting a warrant application must make a particularized 
showing that such a search is necessary. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
As set forth in the State's argument, this requirement entails 
deferential appellate review, asking only whether the affidavit 
contains some factual information upon which a no-knock, 
nighttime search could be authorized. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are virtually 
identical in text. The former provision reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah's "no-knock" search statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
23-10 (1990), states in pertinent part: 
When a search warrant has been issued 
. . the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
. . . 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that 
physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990), governing 
authorization of a nighttime search, states: 
The magistrate must insert a direction 
in the [search] warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other 
good reason; in which case he may insert a 
2 
direction that it be served any time of the 
day or night. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Rene Ruiz was charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony (R. 5). He moved to suppress evidence 
seized in a warranted search of his apartment, arguing that 
authority to conduct the search on a nighttime basis was 
improperly granted (R. 25). The motion was denied (R. 60). 
Defendant then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-
8(2)(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 1). As permitted under State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant reserved the right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 138). He was sentenced 
to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined (R. 93-
94). On appeal, he challenges only the magistrate's 
authorization in the search warrant to conduct the search on a 
no-knock basis and at nighttime. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because defendant does not challenge the underlying 
probable cause finding, this appeal proceeds upon the premise 
that the magistrate properly found probable cause, that is, "a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be 
found in defendant's apartment. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 235, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). This premise is 
supported by a controlled cocaine buy in defendant's apartment 
3 
(warrant affidavit at 2, found at R. 55 and copied at Appendix 2 
to Br. of Appellant). See State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 
(Utah App. 1988) (single drug buy established probable cause), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). The facts bearing upon 
the magistrate's authorization to conduct the search on a no-
knock, nighttime basis are therefore of primary concern. 
The Warrant and the Search 
The warrant affidavit recited that defendant had 
"intense counter surveillance" measures in place. These measures 
had been reported by a confidential informant; the police officer 
affiant had also observed "persons walking back and forth in 
front of the apartment, writting [sic] down license plates, 
watching for persons being followed, and or just being a lookout" 
(affid. at 2). The officer reported that all apparent drug 
trafficking activity around the apartment had been observed "in 
the evening hours" (affid. at 3). He related reports from two 
confidential informants that defendant claimed to have a handgun 
that he would use to defend his contraband (i,d. ) . Finally, the 
officer, a trained narcotics investigator, recited that "[h]and-
guns have been found on most narcotic search warrants" (affid. at 
2, 3). Accordingly, a no-knock, nighttime entry to conduct the 
search was requested, and the magistrate granted the request 
(affid. at 3; warrant at 2, found at R. 52-53 and copied at 
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant). 
The warrant was executed on June 5, 1990, and cocaine, 
packaging materials, and cash was seized, along with four 
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handguns (search warrant return, found at R. 57-59 and copied at 
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant). However, no other circumstances 
of the actual search are disclosed in the record: there is no 
information regarding the precise time of the search, the exact 
manner of entry, the number of officers involved, the number of 
persons on the premises when entry was made, or whether such 
persons, if present, were asleep or awake. 
The Motion to Suppress 
Defendant's motion to suppress, relying on State v. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991), challenged only the authority to conduct the 
search at night (R. 25). He did not challenge the warrant's no-
knock provision. Counsel and the court determined that no 
testimony would be needed to decide the motion; accordingly, 
neither the affiant officer nor defendant testified (R. 97, 104). 
The court and counsel discussed Rowe at length, 
comparing its standards with the warrant affidavit in this case 
(R. 104-121). The trial court observed that the Rowe nighttime 
search request had been supported by little more than checked 
boxes on a pre-printed affidavit (R. 119; see Rowe, 806 P.2d at 
731). In contrast here, reading the affidavit as a whole, the 
court noted the information specifying nighttime drug activity, 
the evident presence of "lookouts," and a risk of armed 
resistance, along with an inference of readily disposable 
contraband (R. 119-21). Accordingly, the court ruled that the 
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affidavit showed "a reasonable basis" for a nighttime search, and 
denied the motion to suppress (R. 121).1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant never challenged the no-knock entry, 
that issue is not properly before this Court. Further, defendant 
has not established the time when the search actually occurred, 
nor shown that anybody was home at the time. Absent such facts, 
he cannot claim harm from the magistrate's authorization of a 
nighttime search. Accordingly, his appeal should be rejected, 
for it turns on "facts" not before this Court. 
If this was a nighttime search, the warrant affidavit 
set forth sufficient information to justify it. Once a probable 
cause finding is made, such that a search will occur, a lower 
quantum of proof and broad deference should be given to decisions 
about how to conduct the search. Such deference should account 
for officer expertise in conducting searches safely and 
effectively. This affidavit adequately showed particular reasons 
for conducting a nighttime search, and the nighttime authority 
granted in the warrant should therefore be reaffirmed. 
Although the prosecutor submitted findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the trial court, defendant objected to them, 
and the trial court apparently did not sign them (R. 74-79). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE "NO-KNOCK" ISSUE, 
AND HAS NOT SHOWN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE 
SEARCH WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED; THEREFORE, THE 
DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD BE 
SUMMARILY AFFIRMED. 
Before proceeding to the merits of the issues on 
appeal, some preliminary matters require attention. As follows, 
there are questions of waiver and an insufficient factual record. 
The latter problem*may allow for summary disposition of this 
appeal. 
A. Only the Nighttime Search Authorization, Not the 
No-Knock Authorization, is Properly Before this 
Court. 
First, because defendant specifically challenged only 
the nighttime search authorization in the warrant (R. 25), his 
present challenge to the no-knock authorization need not be 
considered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a) (grounds for motion must 
be particularly stated). Nor does he show exceptional 
circumstances that would require review of this issue for the 
first time on appeal; accordingly, such review should be deemed 
waived. See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).2 
2Waiver also bars defendant's attempt to attack the warrant as 
not meeting constitutional "particularity" requirements (Br. of 
Appellant at 19-21). An apparent misnumbering of defendant's 
apartment in the warrant affidavit (affid. at 2; compare affid. at 
1, warrant at 1, warrant return at 1), was never brought to the 
trial court's attention. Nor was any argument about lack of 
particularity in the items to be seized made in the trial court. 
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While this Court need not address the no-knock 
question, similar policy concerns—such as possible evidence loss 
and safety considerations—underlie both Utah's no-knock and 
nighttime search statutes. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-
34 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) 
(comparing Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-10 and 77-23-5(1) (1990)). 
Therefore, the State's arguments regarding the nighttime search 
authorization will include reference to no-knock cases. Further, 
if this Court does*not agree that defendant's no-knock challenge 
was waived, the State's arguments in support of the nighttime 
authorization also apply to the no-knock question. 
B. Because Defendant has Not Shown How the Search Was 
Actually Conducted, this Court Need Not Review the 
Nighttime Search Authorization. 
As a second preliminary issue, defendant has not 
established that this search was conducted at night. Nor has he 
shown that anybody was home when his apartment was searched, or 
shown the time of the search. Absent such showings, this Court 
need not review the nighttime search authorization. 
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), officers 
conducted a warranted residential search upon a no-knock entry, 
failing to recognize that their warrant did not authorize such 
entry. However, nobody was home at the time. Ld. at 700-01 & 
n.l. The Utah Supreme Court held that because nobody was home 
when the search occurred, the safety and privacy interests 
underlying the normal Mknock-and-announceM requirement had not 
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been implicated. .Id. Therefore, suppression of the seized 
evidence was not required. Ijd. at 702-03 (citing authorities). 
Under Buck, if a search warrant is executed in a 
clearly unauthorized manner, but no harm to privacy and safety 
interests results, beyond that inherent in a routine search, the 
fruits of the search are admissible as evidence. It should 
follow that if a no-knock or nighttime entry is. authorized in a 
warrant, but officers do not actually execute the warrant on such 
basis, the special*concerns of such searches are also not 
implicated. Indeed, People v. Barber, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 140, 145 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982), reached precisely this result: evidence 
was not suppressed where police did not rely upon an unjustified 
no-knock authorization, but instead announced themselves when 
executing the warrant. 
In light of Buck and Barber, the merits of defendant's 
challenge to the authorization of a nighttime search should not 
be addressed. It may seem likely that because they had authority 
to do so, the officers did conduct a nighttime search. However, 
it is possible that they did not. It is also possible that, as 
in Buck, nobody was home when the entry was made. Nor is there 
any evidence about the hour when the search took place. This is 
important, for not all nighttime searches are equally traumatic. 
See State v. Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 n.l (Utah App. 
March 11, 1992 (search when occupants are more likely to be awake 
is less problematic). 
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The facts of the search as actually conducted are also 
necessary to decide whether, even if an improper nighttime search 
occurred, suppression is the required remedy.3 In United States 
v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 
921, 99 S. Ct. 1247 (1979), a warranted search that was supported 
by probable cause, 586 F.2d at 1119, but where the warrant 
improperly authorized a nighttime search under the applicable 
federal rule, id., at 1122, did not require suppression of the 
seized evidence. Instead, finding no police "bad faith," and no 
unduly "abusive" search, the court held that suppression was not 
required, id. at 1125. Similarly, in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 
1366 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence 
obtained by a police officer acting outside his statutory 
geographic authority was not suppressible. Relying on Searp and 
other authorities, the Court held that absent deliberate, "bad 
faith" police statutory violations, or violations amounting to 
the deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights, suppression 
was not required. 744 P.2d at 1368-69 & nn. 6-13. 
The reasonableness of a warranted search "depends on 
the facts of the case." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Similarly, in 
State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court approved the rule that "a defendant must submit some 
evidence in support of his motion to suppress or the motion would 
3As the petitioner on certiorari in Rowe, now under advisement 
in the Utah Supreme Court the State has argued, as it does here, 
that suppression is not always required when a search is 
erroneously conducted at night. State v. Rowe, No. 910165, Br. of 
Petitioner at 8-17. 
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be denied." Here, in failing to establish facts upon which the 
reasonableness of this search can be assessed, defendant has left 
the State and this Court with no information upon which his 
motion to suppress can be meaningfully reviewed. 
Under these circumstances, any analysis of the 
nighttime search authorization will amount to an advisory 
opinion, based upon hypothetical "facts," disfavored by appellate 
courts. See Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 
P.2d 1216, 1220-2T& n.8 (Utah App. 1991). This Court should 
decline to issue such an opinion; instead, it should summarily 
affirm the denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT TWO 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED A NIGHTTIME 
SEARCH, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE 
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION. 
If it is assumed that this was a nighttime search, the 
magistrate's authorization of such search can be examined. Upon 
reviewing Rowe, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. Under the correct standards of proof and review for 
nighttime search authorization, this ruling should be affirmed. 
A. Nighttime Search Authorization Should be 
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness. 
Defendant clearly believes that a nighttime search 
requires a showing of "probable cause" that such a search is 
necessary (Br. of Appellant at 14, 19), but offers no supporting 
analysis. He is mistaken. As follows, the decision to conduct a 
search at night should require a less strict showing, and be 
deferentially reviewed. 
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1. Reasonableness, Not Probable Cause, Is the Test. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) requires that 
"reasonable cause" be shown to conduct a nighttime search. This 
phrase lends some support to defendant's belief that a nighttime 
search request must satisfy the "probable cause" level of proof. 
See State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1989) 
(equating statutory "reasonable cause" for warrantless arrest 
with "probable cause"). The main opinion in Rowe, however, noted 
that the "precise quantum of information" to justify a nighttime 
search is undefined. 806 P.2d at 733. For several reasons, 
cause to conduct a search at night should require a lesser 
quantum of proof than probable cause. 
First, section 77-23-5(1) comes into play only when 
probable cause to issue the warrant has already been shown. The 
statute simply directs that warrants must normally be served in 
the daytime, unless cause for a nighttime search exists. It 
presupposes the issuance of a warrant, and addresses only the 
question of when the search will occur. Thus probable cause, in 
its usual sense, is no longer in issue when a nighttime search 
request is made. 
Second, the warrant overcomes the core privacy 
expectation of the occupants of the place to be searched: the 
premises are going to be entered, even over the occupants' 
possible objection. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(1) (1990) (if 
occupants do not promptly respond to announcement of purpose, 
searching officers may forcibly enter). Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 
12 
77-23-1 (1990) defines a search warrant as a judicial order to 
search the premises. 
Third, the police, commanded to conduct a search, 
should be allowed some latitude in choosing the best way and time 
to perform this duty. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 
257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1979) (question of how to conduct 
warrant-authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of 
the executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement). 
Accordingly, the nighttime search statute should not be given an 
over-restrictive reading. Instead, nighttime search requests 
under it should be concerned with reasonableness, not probable 
cause. The trial court's "reasonable basis" approach (R. 121) 
was therefore correct. 
Section 77-23-5, as construed in Rowe, requires a 
nighttime search request to show a risk of evidence loss, or 
"other good reason," such as a physical safety risk, if a daytime 
search is attempted. 806 P.2d at 733-34 & n.5. As a 
reasonableness question, the quantum of proof for such a showing 
should be more akin to "reasonable suspicion" than to "probable 
cause." So long as some evidence, specific to the case at hand, 
suggests that evidence may be lost, or safety may be imperiled in 
a daytime search, the nighttime search request should be granted. 
See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (defining 
reasonable suspicion). 
A similar rule was followed in United States v. Searp, 
586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 921, 99 S. 
13 
Ct. 1247 (1979), interpreting the federal nighttime search rule. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the federal provision "requires only 
some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater 
intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the 
exigencies of the situation." 586 F.2d at 1121. The federal 
rule is similar to Utah's nighttime search statute: "The warrant 
shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by 
appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause 
shown, authorizes Its execution at times other than daytime." 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1) (West 1991 Rev. Ed.). Utah's nighttime 
search statute should be similarly construed. 
As a matter of policy, a defendant should not be 
allowed to defeat a valid probable cause finding by claiming that 
the decision of how to act upon that finding must be based upon 
an equally strict standard of proof. Efforts to avoid the 
detection of criminal activity do not create a expectation that 
such activity will remain "private." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 
51 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981). 
By selling illegal drugs at night (affid. at 3), defendant did 
not confer legal protection upon that crime. Accordingly, this 
Court should hold that reasonableness, or a reasonable suspicion-
type standard, applies to nighttime search requests. 
2. Appellate Deference is Appropriate. 
Defendant also argues for nondeferential appellate 
review of nighttime search authorization in a warrant (Br. of 
appellant at 8-13). His argument, however, is derived from State 
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v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991), which deals solely with 
the question of probable cause to issue the warrant, .id. at 832. 
This issue, again, is not presented on this appeal. His argument 
is also based upon Judge Orme's criticisms of deferential warrant 
review, in his Weaver concurrence, not the main opinion. 
Therefore, Weaver only minimally supports defendant, if at all. 
The reasons for requiring a lower quantum of proof for 
a nighttime search, already set forth in this brief, also support 
deferential review"* of nighttime search authority. Further, 
notwithstanding dictum in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 734 n.5 ("of course, 
ordinarily a nighttime search would pose a heightened safety risk 
. . . " ) , additional deference is due because of officer expertise 
in performing searches. Police officers, not appellate courts, 
are charged with executing warrants successfully, such that 
evidence will not be lost. They are also the ones at risk for 
real physical injury in carrying out a task that, at best, must 
be fraught with hazard. Reviewing courts should not 
overscrutinize the means, requested by officers and then approved 
by a magistrate, by which a search is conducted. 
Defendant asserts that nondeferential review of search 
warrants is necessary because "Utah magistrates do not uniformly 
have the opportunity to develop expertise in issuing search 
warrants" (Br. of Appellant at 10). This assertion is neither 
"generally known," nor "capable of accurate and ready 
determination." Therefore, contrary to defendant's invitation, 
it should not be judicially noticed. See Utah R. Evid. 201(b). 
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Efforts to put "magistrate expertise" into issue should be 
supported with evidence, not conjecture/ 
Hindsight-based, nondeferential review of nighttime 
search requests would not advance the interest in stable, 
consistent results. See State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 
(Utah App. 1991). Indeed, a possible reversal of this nighttime 
authorization by a two-to-one, split appellate decision would 
actually reflect a three-to-two determination of all the involved 
judges—magistrate, trial court, and this Court—that the 
authorization was valid. Therefore, particularly in a close 
case, c£. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835 (Orme, J., concurring), 
deference to the warrant is appropriate. 
Accordingly, officer opinion that a nighttime search is 
more likely to safely succeed than a daytime search should not be 
lightly dismissed by a magistrate, and certainly, once approved 
by a magistrate, should not be subject to nondeferential, after-
the-fact reversal on appeal. In Rowe, a nighttime authorization 
was reversed because this Court could find no. evidence, in the 
warrant affidavit, showing cause for such a search. 806 P.2d at 
734. However, so long as some evidence supports such cause, a 
magistrate's authorization for a nighttime search should be not 
be reversed unless it is clearly unreasonable. 
defendant also implies that some magistrates neglect their 
duty to enforce the federal and state constitutions, see U.S. 
Const. Art VI, cl. 3, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 10, at the behest of 
"forum shopping" law officers (Br. of Appellant at 11-12). This 
accusation is also unsupported, and should be rejected. 
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B. The Magistrate's Authorization of a Nighttime 
Search in this Case Should be Reaffirmed. 
Under the foregoing standards, this nighttime search 
authorization was valid. Both concerns for evidence loss and for 
safety risks were shown in the affidavit, read "in a common sense 
manner and as a whole," Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
Evidence might have been lost during a daytime, more 
easily observed, officer approach to the premises. Informants 
told the affiant officer that defendant had counter-surveillance 
measures in place, and this information was confirmed by direct 
observation (affid. at 2). In his expertise, the observing 
officer reasonably concluded that the people seen in front of 
defendant's apartment and writing things down, were acting as 
"lookouts" for defendant (id). The use of lookouts, in turn, 
supports a reasonable inference that defendant had measurers in 
place to quickly dispose of contraband upon a warning that 
officers were approaching. 
Safety concerns were supported by defendant's 
statements, reported by informants, that he was armed and 
intended to forcibly defend his drugs (affid. at 3). Further, 
defendant has not challeged the affiant officer's statement that 
"[h]andguns have been found on most narcotic search warrants" 
(id.). The fact that drug dealers are often armed, well within 
the officer's experience, has also been noticed by Utah's 
appellate courts. State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Leonard, 175 Utah 
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Adv. Rep. 49, 54 n.9 (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991), petition for cert. 
filed. No. 920140 (Utah March 11, 1992). Accord People v. 
Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Colo. 1989). 
Accordingly, the magistrate's decision that a nighttime 
search would be more likely to succeed, and less likely to result 
in bodily injury, was properly affirmed by the trial court. 
Accord United States v. Prvor, 652 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 (D. Me. 
1987) (finding "genuine risks" if search of suspected armed 
robber's room were attempted in daytime); People v. Kimble, 44 
Cal. 3d 480, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803, 810 n.6 (1988) 
(citing Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure); State v. 
Ailport, 412 N.W. 2d 35, 36 (Minn. App. 1987) (safety 
justification for nighttime search supported by affiant officer's 
experience that searches are often resisted). This Court should 
therefore reaffirm the nighttime search authorization. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to produce evidence that this 
probable cause-supported search was actually conducted at night, 
or that the search might have been unreasonable in any respect. 
Further, the magistrate's authorization to conduct the search at 
night was supported by the warrant affidavit. For these reasons, 
the denial of defendant's motion to suppress, and his conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance, should be affirmed. 
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